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Abstract
Throughout the 1990s states created budget stabilization (rainy day) funds to help provide
counter-cyclical support in their budgeting process.  Today 46 states have rainy day
funds.  Despite the sweeping popularity of such funds, many states have failed to adopt
either contribution or expenditure rules that would create significant balances in their
rainy day accounts.  The recent state fiscal crisis found only 4 states with fund balances
in excess of 10% and consequently many states found that their rainy day funds failed to
provide significant fiscal relief during the latest recession.
This paper ask the question; what would happen if a national rainy day fund were
established for the states with specific contribution and expenditure rules?  The proposed
fund would borrow from the unemployment compensation trust fund model by creating
experience ratings for each state that would trigger differential fund contributions.  Also
like the UI system, borrowing would be permitted from the pooled fund, with interest
being charged to the borrowing state. Simulations on fund performance under differing
rules are provided.
This national fund would be designed to create an aggregate rainy day balance of 15% of
state expenditures.  By constructing a national fund, local state pressure to spend reserve
balances whenever they reach significant levels, could be avoided.  In addition, a more
tightly constructed fund might improve state credit ratings and reduce capital financing
costs for states.
Richard Mattoon
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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Ph: 312-322-2428
e-mail: Rick.Mattoon@chi.frb.orgThe last three fiscal years have proven to be extremely challenging for state
policymakers.  A relatively shallow national recession precipitated a state budget crisis as
revenues plunged and expenses for programs such as Medicaid and education spiked.
Boom and bust cycles have long plagued state governments.  In the past, revenue and
expenditure volatility has often triggered tax increases and spending cuts.  
In response to this volatility, state governments have increasingly tried to build savings to
help bridge downturns in the economy that effect their budgets.  Often these budget
stabilization funds are called “rainy day” funds and are intended to serve as counter-
cyclical aid.  Currently 46 states have rainy day funds.
Rainy day funds have some general properties.  These include:
•  The funds are designed to accumulate revenues during periods of strong economic
performance.
•  They can improve a state’s credit rating by demonstrating that a state has sufficient
reserves to weather a moderate recession without making drastic fiscal adjustments.
•  They are designed to be counter-cyclical funds.  They should be sufficient to weather
an economic slowdown, but are not designed to address a structural budget deficit.
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•  They are sometimes designed to have contribution rules requiring states to make
regular or semi-regular appropriations to the fund.
•  Withdrawals from rainy day funds are often made as part of a political process and
are only sometimes based on specific rules.
Leading up to the most recent recession, states had accumulated (by historical standards)
significant rainy day funds.  On a national level total fund balances (rainy day plus other
savings) by FY 2000 exceeded 10% of state spending.
2  Given that bond-rating agencies
have long recommended that fund balances should be kept at a minimum of 5%, the 10%
figure suggested that reserves would be sufficient to weather a mild recession.  However,
this has not proven to be the case.  In retrospect, several analysts have suggested that
balance levels would need to be in the 18% to 20% range if they were to provide
significant counter-cyclical aid.
3  The problem with this is that it would be politically
difficult for any state governor or legislature to have a 20% rainy day fund over any
period of time without pressure being applied to reduce the balance through either
expenditure increases or tax cuts.  Efforts to protect rainy day funds from budget raids
often fall short of requiring that fund levels build significant balances.  Often states are
only required to fill the fund to a given balance level (usually less than 10% of
expenditures) and then are released from further contributions.  Given this reality, states
tend to under-save.
                                                          
1 While rainy day funds should not be used to address a structural deficit, it may be worth considering using
rainy day funds to offset future program costs that can be forecasted because of demographic or economic
changes.  Work on intertemporal state budgeting by Baker, Besendorf and Kotlikoff (2002) provides a
framework through which states can estimate future budget requirements based on the evolving structure of
their states economy.  Much like an individual saving for their child’s college or retirement, rainy day funds
could be used to offset these predictable future expenditure needs.
2 National Association of State Budget Officers, “The Fiscal Survey of the States 2003”, p.13
3 Zahradnick, Bob and Rose Riberio, “Heavy Weather: are state rainy day funds working” p.1.The recent experience of Wisconsin highlights the pressures on state rainy day funds.
The state created such a fund in 1985 but has been reluctant to actually put revenue into
the fund.  As of the beginning of June 2003, the fund had a balance of only $2,600.  The
battle over the value of creating significant reserves was highlighted by Wisconsin
Assembly Speaker John Gard who said, ”The difference between families and
government is that families are saving their own money and the government’s money is
someone else’s.”  “While rainy day funds can be helpful, a lot of the time they’re over-
taxation funds.”
4 University of Wisconsin professor Don Kettl has also observed that
rainy day funds have been too easy of a source of funding.  As Kettl puts it, “the
weather’s always cloudy, and its easy to dip into it.”  In the case of Wisconsin this seems
to be an apt description.  If revenues haven’t been channeled to program expansions, they
have been used for tax cuts such as the one-time $700 million sales-tax rebate provided in
1998.
This paper suggests that a national rainy day fund be established based on an
unemployment insurance compensation trust fund model.  Participating states would
make contributions to this pooled fund based on flexible contribution rules and could
make withdrawals and borrow from the fund in bad times.  The justification for such a
proposal is based on a several stylized facts that suggest that a properly funded rainy day
fund could provide meaningful stability to state budgets.
•  States (with the exception of Vermont) must balance their budgets annually.
Meaningful counter-cyclical assistance is more important to states (than the federal
government that can run deficits) that often see service demands rise when revenues
and resources are falling.
•  State revenues have become more volatile as states have grown to rely on narrower,
and often more elastic tax basis such as personal income, and higher nominal rates.
The recent recession showed that a shallow decline in economic activity could have a
profound effect on state revenues.
•  Federal devolution has increased the importance of state programs.  State
responsibility for education, health care and prisons has grown and insuring adequate
funding over an economic downturn has become a more important need.  
•  States seem reluctant to “fix” their tax structures to better mange volatility.  In
addition, it is unclear that revenue volatility is necessarily a bad thing if states are
willing to create budget stabilization tools.  Efforts to broaden major tax bases, such
as subjecting services to sales taxation, have seen little progress.
•  From a political perspective, it is unrealistic that states will ever be able to build
sufficient reserves to protect against any significant budget shortfall.  A fund that
would be insulated from state political pressures could accumulate larger reserves.
•  Federal assistance to help bridge a state fiscal shortfall is unlikely.  The federal
government is often in no better fiscal shape in a recession than the states and is likely
to be grudging in helping states out of a bind.
                                                          
4 Phil Brinkman, “Budget Woes Have No Easy Solutions”, The Capitol Times and Wisconsin State Journal,
June 15, 2003, D1.•  A large national rainy day fund could improve the credit-worthiness of the state and
local sector.  Rating agencies could reward states with better credit ratings (lowering
borrowing costs) in response to the creation of such a fund.
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•  By smoothing state fiscal reaction to recessions, a national rainy day fund could
reduce the drag that state tax increases or expenditure cuts might have on the national
economy.
•  An adequately funded rainy day fund could help states adjust to unanticipated
program expenses such as when the September 11
th disaster forced higher spending
for security programs in most states. 
•  Finally, a properly funded rainy day fund could reduce fiscal pressure on local
government.  With states increasing responsibility for funding K-12 education and
providing local government assistance, recent state budget gaps have lead to
reductions in state aid to localities that in turn often force increases in local property
taxes and fees.
Other reasons why rainy day funds are a good idea
Knight and Levinson (1999) examined the saving behavior of states with rainy day funds.
A common concern is that rainy day funds displace other forms of savings that a state
might already undertake.  The authors major finding is that even when state fixed effects
are included in their econometric work, the existence of a rainy day fund increased total
state savings dollar for dollar.
6  The point estimate from the fixed effects regression
suggests that states that adopted rainy day funds saved 14% more than before they
adopted such funds.
7 The existence of a rainy day fund can promote state savings. 
Knight and Levinson also found some limited evidence that states with stricter deposit
and withdrawal rules tended to save more than states that simply transferred budget
surpluses or permitted withdrawals by appropriation.  Sobel and Holcombe (1996) had
observed that during the 1990-91 recession, only states with strict deposit requirements
had found that their rainy day funds significantly reduced fiscal stress.
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In addition, Wagner (2002) offers some additional benefits from rainy day funds. These
include:
•  A proper rainy day fund can reduce the overall level of “fiscal uncertainty.”  A stable
economic environment is an important component in the investment decisions of the
private sector.  The use of surplus funds as an alternative to tax increases and/or
expenditure cuts will aid in the promotion of private investment.
                                                          
5 One study found that states with strict governing rules for the construction of their rainy day funds had
borrowing costs of up to 10 basis points (.10 percentage points) lower than states with more discretionary
rain day funds.  See Wagner, G.A. and J.M. Gropp, 2002.  “The Municipal Bond Market and Fiscal
Institutions:  Have Budget Stabilization Funds Reduced State Borrowing Costs?” Unpublished manuscript,
Duquesne University.
6 Brian Knight and Arik Levinson, “Rainy Day Funds and State Government Savings”, National Tax
Journal, Vol. LII, no.3, September 1999, pp.459-472.
7 Knight and Levinson, p.468.
8 Sobel and Holcombe (1996)•  Use of a rainy day fund can reduce the time and energy expended by policymakers
during fiscal crises modifying existing policies/programs.  Cutting programs that
provide long-term benefits to the state in order to bridge a temporary fiscal crisis
makes little policy sense.
•  Rainy day funds can reduce tax increases during periods of fiscal stress and help keep
the “excess burden of taxation” (the social costs of taxes) low.
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A history of rainy day funds
Many states created rainy day funds in the wake of the 1980-82 recession but funds
balances did not begin to appreciably build until the 1990s.  Prior to the 1990-91
recession, only about half of the states had such funds and total balances (rainy day plus
all other fund balances) prior to the recession were $12.5 billion or 4.8% of spending.
Prior to creating rainy day funds, states did have savings that they used to carry them
through unanticipated budget problems.  However, these were usually surpluses in
general funds and as such were always vulnerable to political pressure for new spending
or tax cuts.  The advent of the rainy day fund was an effort to bring structure to state
savings and reduce its ad hoc quality.
By the mid-1990s most states had created rainy day funds.  This was not only seen as a
good budgeting practice, but was strongly encouraged by debt rating agencies that were
interested in seeing states build reserves that might prevent tax hikes and budget cuts
during recessions.  Currently only 5 states do not have rainy day funds (Arkansas,
Colorado, Illinois, Kansas and Montana).  
Despite the popularity of these funds, many states have chosen fund designs that have
compromised their effectiveness  (table 1).  On the contribution side, many states cap the
total revenues that can be placed in the fund.  For example, 19 states limit the size of their
rainy day funds to 5% or less of expenditures.  Eight states limit the fund size to between
5% and 10%, while 9 states limit the fund to 10%.  Only 10 states have no cap on their
rainy day fund.  Evidence suggests that cap limits reduced savings effort.  For example
states with a cap of less than 5% only saw their fund balances grow from around 1% of
expenditures in 1993 to 3.7% of expenditures by 2000.  In comparison states with
uncapped funds saw their fund balances grow from 2.3% to 9.0%. 
Table 1—Structure of Rainy Day Funds (as of 2002)
Deposit Rules Withdrawal rules Fund size
1=appropriation 1=appropriation 1=5% of budget or less
2=general fund surplus 2=revenue shortfall 2=between 5% and 25%
3=required appropriation 3=supermajority 3=no limit
4=stautory formula 4=stautory formula
State Year Adopted Deposit Rule Withdrawal  Fund Size
                                                          
9 Wagner, Gary A., Fiscal Stress and State Rainy Day Funds: Are They the Answer for Brighter Days
Ahead?  Mimeo, Duquesne University, 2002, p.6.Rule
Alabama NO FUND
Alaska 1986 1 1 3
Arkansas NO FUND
Arizona 1990 4 4 2
California 1985 2 2 3
Colorado 1983 3 2 1
Connecticut 1979 2 3 1
Delaware 1977 2 3 1
Florida 1959 2 2 2
Georgia 1976 2 1 3
Hawaii NO FUND
Idaho 1984 1 1 3
Illinois* 2000 1 1 1
Indiana 1982 4 4 2
Iowa 1992 1 1 1
Kansas 1993 3 1 3
Kentucky 1983 2 1 1
Louisiana 1990 2 1 3
Massachusetts 1986 2 1 1
Maine 1985 2 1 1
Maryland 1986 3 1 1
Michigan 1977 4 4 2
Minnesota 1981 1 1 2
Mississippi 1982 1 1 2
State Year Adopted Deposit Rule Withdrawal
Rule
Fund Size
Missouri 1992 1 1 1
Montana NO FUND
Nebraska 1983 2 2 3
Nevada 1994 4 2 2
New
Hampshire
1987 2 2 1
New Jersey 1990 2 2 1
New Mexico 1978 2 1 1
New York 1945 4 2 3
North Carolina 1991 2 1 1
North Dakota 1987 2 4 3
Ohio 1981 2 1 3
Oklahoma 1985 2 3 3
Oregon NO FUND
Pennsylvania 1985 2 3 1
Rhode Island 1985 1 2 1South Carolina 1978 3 2 3
South Dakota 1991 2 2 1
Tennessee 1972 3 2 1
Texas 1987 2 2 2
Utah 1986 2 2 2
Vermont 1988 2 2 1
Virginia 1992 4 4 2
Washington 1981 2 3 1
West Virginia 1994 2 2 1
Wisconsin 1981 3 2 3
Wyoming 1982 1 1 1
Source:  Wagner (2002)
*authors note—while called a rainy day fund, the Illinois RDF is really designed as an
annual supplement to the budget.
Contributions are also frequently hampered by inadequate contribution rules.  In 30 states
contributions are based on depositing a portion of the year-end surplus.  In these cases the
contribution is determined only after decisions about tax cuts or spending increases that
will effect the size of the surplus are made.  Surpluses are not predictable so this is hardly
a formula for a rigorous savings plan.  Ironically, while the states may not be overly strict
with their contribution rules, some states are overly strict with requirements for
replenishing fund balances.  The problem with strict replenishment rules is that they often
dissuade states from using rainy day funds as intended (counter-cyclical support).  For
example, Alaska, Florida and New York require that withdrawals be replenished in 5
years while Missouri and South Carolina require repayments within 3 years.  The most
restrictive are Rhode Island (2 years) and the District of Columbia (1 year).  The problem
with such strict repayment requirements is that states are forced to replenish their funds
with resources that might be needed for other programs.  Replenishing a rainy day fund
may not be a state’s top expenditure priority.  Furthermore, as counter-cyclical budget
tool, it only makes sense to replenish the fund in good economic times.
States have also gotten into a bind over requirements to limit withdrawals from their
rainy day funds.  Ten states (Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas and Washington) require legislative super-majorities to
release funds.  The requirement of a supermajority can pose problems if a minority party
has sufficient clout to block release of rainy day funds in an effort to damage the majority
parties ability to respond to a fiscal crisis.  Other states limit the amount of money that
can be withdrawn at any one time.  In Idaho, Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee
and Virginia, one-time withdrawals are typically capped at 50% of the fund balance.  In
Arizona, Indiana and Michigan the level of fund withdrawal is limited to a formula that is
tied to the severity of the economic downturn. (For example, in Michigan, transfers from
the rainy day fund to the general fund are permitted when real annual growth in personal
income is negative or unemployment in any quarter exceeds 8%.  The level of transfer is
equal to the percentage decline in personal income multiplied by the general funds annual
revenue.  The amount of transfer cannot exceed the amount necessary to balance thebudget.)  Clearly, some limits should be placed on haphazardly spending rainy day
balances, but states should be allowed some flexibility in how they chose to use savings
to meet financial emergencies.
Some states also limit the use of rainy day funds.  In the Oregon, rainy day funds can
only be used to support education.  In the District of Columbia only 44% of the funds can
be used in the event of an economic downturn (remaining fund availability is for a natural
disaster).  In the case of the state of Georgia, a Governor can only recommend using an
amount equal to 2% of revenues regardless of the available balance in the fund. 
In many cases the hesitancy to spend rainy day funds stems from a fear that an even
rainer day may lay ahead (a reasonable concern) or fear that spending rainy day reserves
will effect a state’s credit rating.  In judging whether it is prudent to hold back on using
rainy day funds in the face of future economic softness, a state must examine the timing
of economic recovery and its effects on revenues.  In addition it must examine its revenue
system to determine whether its revenue problem is cyclical or structural.  If it is cyclical,
the timing of economic recovery may be adequate to rebalance the state’s books.  This
might encourage the state to spend more of its rainy day balance upfront.  If the problem
is structural, using a rainy day fund will prove to be the wrong fiscal tool since a counter-
cyclical fund cannot solve a structural revenue problem and may mask the need to make
fundamental reform to the states tax and expenditure system.  As for concerns about
ratings downgrades, it is true that Standard & Poor’s gives a “strong” rating to
governments with fund balances with reserves of 15% or better, but it is not true that they
expect governments to never use these fund balances.  Standard & Poor’s comments,
“Use of reserves is not a credit weakness in and of itself.  These reserves are accumulated
in order to be spent during times of budgetary imbalance and extraordinary economic
events.  The last month has highlighted the importance and critical nature of these
reserves from a credit standpoint.  Given this period of economic uncertainty, a balanced
approach of adjusting spending and drawing on reserves will reduce out-year structural
imbalance.”
10  
Recent performance of Rainy Day Funds
By the end of 2000, states had amassed total reserve balances of $48.8 billion or 10.4%
of spending.  These reserves represented rainy day funds plus other savings such as
budget surpluses and other fund balances.  (Rainy day balances peaked in 2000 at 5.85%
of expenditures.)  States have used this money aggressively drawing balances down to
3.4% of spending by the end of FY 2003 and an estimated 1.3% by FY 2004.  The use of
this money has provided $33 billion in relief that otherwise would have been made up
through program cuts or tax increases.  The 10.4% reserve size would have proven
adequate to bridge a one-year deficit in 2002.  The 2002 deficit was estimated at roughly
$37 billion or 7.2% of spending.  However larger deficits in 2003 ($79 billion or 15.1%
of spending) and 2004 ($78 billion or 15% of spending) have exhausted reserves.    
                                                          
10 Standard & Poor’s, Commentary on the States, October 18, 2001.The level of fund balance continues to vary widely suggesting the still ad hoc nature of
these rainy day funds.  While the aggregate balance by 2000 was 10.4%, and the rainy
day balance hit 5.85%, only 4 states, Michigan, Minnesota, Alaska and California were in
fact carrying rainy day balances of greater than 10%.  In fact, these four states accounted
for over 51% ($14.044 billion out of the $27.4 billion) of rainy day fund balances.
(figure 1, table 2) Given this uneven level of savings effort, a national contribution rule
could substantially increase aggregate available balances.
Table 2.  Rainy Day Fund Balances and Fund Balances as a Percent of State






















Alabama $3 .06% $13 .25% 42
Alaska 2,734 120.87 2,857 118.40 1
Arkansas 0 0 0 0 43
Arizona 408 6.79 266 4.06 23
California 8,666 13.03 2,596 3.30 26
Colorado 583 9.73 0 0 44
Connecticut 564 5.17 595 5.0 14
Delaware 114 5.08 126 5.13 13
Florida 1,666 8.98 941 4.64 19
Georgia 551 4.00 618 4.18 21
Hawaii 6 .19 54 1.48 39
Idaho 36 2.14 73 3.57 25
Illinois* 0 0 230 .92 41
Indiana 540 6.02 526 5.48 9
Iowa 444 9.32 463 9.55 3
Kansas 0 0 0 0 45
Kentucky 279 4.26 239 3.26 28
Louisiana 59 1.02 150 2.34 33
Massachuset
ts
1608 7.72 1,715 7.58 5
Maine 144 6.21 123 4.74 17
Maryland 582 6.45 563 5.22 12
Michigan 1,264 13.20 500 5.37 11
Minnesota 1,380 12.03 1,140 8.81 4
Mississippi 232 6.60 192 5.41 10
Missouri 143 1.95 156 1.99 36
Montana 0 0 0 0 46
Nebraska 142 6.06 110 4.14 22Nevada 136 8.46 136 7.36 6
New
Hampshire
20 1.95 55 4.78 16
New Jersey 698 3.59 720 3.20 30
New Mexico 0 0 0 0 47
New York 547 1.47 627 1.49 38
North
Carolina
38 .27 339 2.33 34
North
Dakota
0 0 0 0 48
Ohio 1,003 5.21 1,011 4.57 20
Oklahoma 158 3.48 170 3.27 27
Oregon 0 0 0 0 49
Pennsylvani
a
1,097 5.69 1,223 5.91 8
Rhode
Island
71 3.18 81 3.06 31
South
Carolina
145 2.81 63 1.13 40
South
Dakota
37 4.80 40 4.70 18
Tennessee 165 2.50 178 2.36 32
Texas 85 .31 550 1.76 37
Utah 110 3.27 125 3.21 29
Vermont 41 4.80 44 4.93 15
Virginia 575 5.10 865 7.03 7
Washington 754 7.38 421 3.75 24
West
Virginia
73 2.77 63 2.12 35
Wisconsin 0 0 0 0 50
Wyoming 39 7.53 130 20.63 2
U.S. total 27,389 5.85 21,087 4.05
Source:  Fiscal Survey of the States: December, 2002, National Governors Association
and the National Association of State Budget Officers.Rules governing rainy day fund structure—
Contributions
Several states have rules forcing contributions.  The following are some potential
contribution rules
•  Contributions based on economic growth.  Indiana and Michigan both require
contributions to their rainy day funds when personal income growth exceeds 2%.  
•  Contributions based on maintaining minimum fund size.  Colorado requires that the
budget reserve must be maintained at 4% of general fund appropriations, although if
expenditures are made from the reserve, the reserve can fall to 2%




















2002•  Contributions from general fund surplus.  Some states require that all or part of any
surplus generated in the general fund is deposited to the rainy day fund. (Arizona)
•  Contributions based on revenues.  One rule is for 5% of annual revenue growth to be
dedicated to the rainy day fund.  Proposals have also been based on a percentage
(example 1%) of general revenues.
RDF withdrawal rules
Several states have automatic rules for making withdrawals of rainy day funds.  These
include:
•  Arizona allows transfers of rainy day balances when real personal income growth is
less than 2% and less than the seven-year trend.
•  Colorado automatically transfers rainy day balances when revenues decline from
forecasted levels.
•  Indiana requires automatic transfers to the general fund if annual growth in personal
income is less than negative 2%.  The amount of the transfer is driven by a formula in
which annual general fund revenues are multiplied by the percentage by which annual
personal income growth is less than negative 2%.  For example if personal income
grows at negative 5%, the automatic transfer would be 3% of general fund revenues.
Michigan’s is similar but the transfer is based on the total percentage decline in
personal income times general fund revenues.
•  Minnesota uses a two-pronged test.  Withdrawals can be made when a deficit in the
general fund is projected and “objective measures” reflect a downturn in the state’s
economy.  These measures include, reduced growth in total wages, retail sales or
employment.
•  Texas permits the appropriation of money from its rainy day fund when general
revenues are less than the appropriations made by the preceding legislature or if
anticipated revenues for a succeeding biennium are less than the revenues available
for the current biennium.
The modest proposal—a unemployment insurance trust fund style national rainy
day fund
The notion this paper proposes is to set up a national risk pool to provide counter-cyclical
aid to states during tough budget years.  A similar counter-cyclical fund is the private,
unemployment insurance compensation trust fund, where individual states establish tax
and benefit rules for contributions and withdrawals from the fund but fund resources are
pooled nationally permitting states that exhaust their available fund balances to borrow.
In the UI system states set a range of tax rates for different types of employers usually
based on the tendency of that employer to use UI funds.  Employers with more frequent
layoffs pay a higher tax rate than stable employers since they are more likely to use the
fund.  This is usually referred to as an “experience” rating.  
Part of the success of the UI system is that states that fail to adequately contribute to the
fund do have to pay interest on loans and this helps states to adjust their UI system to
return their portion of the fund to balance.In this stylized national rainy day proposal, states would also be given different
“experience” ratings that would require larger contributions under certain circumstances.
The goal of this fund would be for each state to accumulate a fund balance of 15%.  This
will require a two-stage process.  Initially the fund will need to be capitalized and as this
simulation will show, that will be no easy process.  Once capitalized an “experience
rating” will need to be assigned to each state based on the state’s experience in using
rainy day funds. This “experience” rating could be based on either a state specific value
at risk model or based on a floating cap for each state’s fund balance.  State’s whose
expenditure and tax variability proved to be low would be permitted to reduce the level of
their rainy day fund balance to 10% while states with high variability might be required
to increase their balance to greater than 15%.
In addition, this proposal would also create a withdrawal rule that would limit annual
withdrawals to 50% of a states total fund balance and would authorize withdrawals only
when a state’s real revenue growth is negative, or unemployment rises by greater than 1%
from the previous year or personal income growth is negative. 
Step 1—capitalizing a national rainy day fund balance—contribution rules
The goal of the national rainy day fund would be for each state to initially amass a
minimum fund balance of 15% of prior year expenditures.  Reaching this level, as
simulations  will show can take some time unless a state was willing to contribute a
large lump sum amount to its fund balance.  (For example, tobacco settlement or other
legal settlement funds, unanticipated budget surpluses).  At a minimum, the goal would
be to establish a contribution rule that rewards states that reach given fund balance
levels.  The proposed rule would create four tiers for contributions.  
RDF fund balance Contribution rule
Balance of  0 to 5% 1% of general fund revenue (+) 5% of total
revenue growth
Balance of  5% to 10% 1% of general fund revenue
Balance of  10% to 15% 5% of total revenue growth (not to exceed
1% of general fund revenue)
Balance of 15%+ No contribution required
A simulation of applying such a contribution rule from 1992 to 2001 demonstrates that
in aggregate, even if the first tier rule of 1% of general fund revenues plus 5% of
revenue growth had been applied during this period, the accumulated rainy day fund
balance would have reached only 10.0% (approximately $109 billion) of 2000 state
expenditures  (table 3).  However such a rule would have left 30 states with fund
balances of 10% or greater, a significant improvement on the actual state performance
over this period.  One of the assumptions in performing this exercise, is that the era 
from 1992 to 2001 represents a period of strong economic performance that would have
allowed the states to make fund contributions while avoiding making withdrawals.A second simulation recognizes what rainy day fund balances would have been if the
same contribution rule was used and any existing (1993) fund balance were applied.
The result improves the aggregate fund balance total to 10.5% of 2000 expenditures but
reflects the fact that existing rainy day fund balances in 1993 were only $5 billion.    
Table 3--rainy day fund balances simulated from 1992 to 2001 
RDF balance RDF balance 
contribution tier 1,  as % of 2000 contribution tier 1 as % of 2000 2000
1% of general revenues expenditures (+) any existing expenditures expenditures
(+) 5% of revenue growth RDF balance
(RDF balance, $ in thousands) (%)  (balance, $ in thousands) (%)
United States                          108,835,720.89                  10.0                 114,133,720.89  10.5   1,084,097,152 
Alabama                              1,535,705.13                    9.7                     1,535,705.13  9.7        15,872,589 
Alaska                                 930,811.47                  14.1                     1,657,811.47  25.1          6,611,154 
Arizona                              1,548,044.81                    9.5                     1,590,044.81  9.7        16,315,915 
Arkansas                                 972,942.44                  10.1                        972,942.44  10.1          9,589,172 
California                            14,381,151.80                    9.6                   14,381,151.80  9.6      149,772,310 
Colorado                              1,544,674.15                  11.1                     1,679,674.15  12.1        13,929,779 
Connecticut                              1,670,376.91                  10.0                     1,670,376.91  10.0        16,723,201 
Delaware                                 463,810.24                  11.0                        535,810.24  12.7          4,210,656 
Florida                              4,711,091.27                  10.4                     5,007,091.27  11.1        45,207,930 
Georgia                              2,619,254.47                  10.6                     2,886,254.47  11.6        24,812,898 
Hawaii                                 621,121.34                    9.4                        621,121.34  9.4          6,604,609 
Idaho                                 483,137.48                  10.8                        516,137.48  11.5          4,492,552 
Illinois                              4,180,937.79                  10.2                     4,180,937.79  10.2        41,182,904 
Indiana                              1,940,137.50                    9.6                     2,310,137.50  11.4        20,289,362 
Iowa                              1,046,955.79                    9.1                     1,084,955.79  9.5        11,453,109 
Kansas                                 945,012.96                  10.4                     1,017,012.96  11.1          9,123,858 
Kentucky                              1,645,254.52                  10.5                     1,735,254.52  11.1        15,682,365 
Louisiana                              1,676,007.46                  10.1                     1,676,007.46  10.1        16,553,676 
Maine                                 546,099.82                  10.0                        563,099.82  10.3          5,448,061 
Maryland                              1,924,476.48                    9.9                     2,086,476.48  10.8        19,370,058 
Massachusetts                              2,926,446.94                    9.9                     3,309,446.94  11.2        29,478,165 
Michigan                              4,654,842.54                  10.9                     5,430,842.54  12.7        42,748,895 
Minnesota                              2,272,656.03                    9.7                     2,772,656.03  11.9        23,326,005 
Mississippi                              1,076,854.15                    9.8                     1,271,854.15  11.6        10,972,174 
Missouri                              1,812,315.49                  10.5                     1,849,315.49  10.7        17,293,111 
Montana                                 360,337.74                    9.7                        360,337.74  9.7          3,718,168 
Nebraska                                 586,968.51                  10.2                        614,968.51  10.7          5,772,418 
Nevada                                 607,440.76                  10.0                        625,440.76  10.3          6,047,267 
New Hampshire                                 404,428.37                    9.3                        423,428.37  9.7          4,366,072 
New Jersey                              3,441,704.02                    9.9                     3,600,704.02  10.4        34,783,171 
New Mexico                                 926,202.15                  10.6                        926,202.15  10.6          8,700,579 
New York                              9,313,186.48                    9.6                     9,447,186.48  9.7        96,924,806 
North Carolina                              3,001,229.74                  10.1                     3,212,229.74  10.8        29,615,132 
North Dakota                                 309,448.35                  10.8                        309,448.35  10.8          2,855,663 
Ohio                              4,106,060.39                    9.2                     4,387,060.39  9.8        44,630,567 
Oklahoma                              1,137,680.30                  10.7                     1,182,680.30  11.1        10,629,560 
Oregon                              1,631,534.57                  10.3                     1,700,534.57  10.8        15,776,050 Pennsylvania                              4,465,268.76                    9.4                     4,495,268.76  9.4        47,681,749 
Rhode Island                                 452,173.10                    9.7                        495,173.10  10.7          4,648,008 
South Carolina                              1,449,364.52                    8.9                     1,549,364.52  9.5        16,236,728 
South Dakota                                 266,406.28                  11.1                        288,406.28  12.0          2,403,103 
Tennessee                              1,682,404.87                  10.0                     1,783,404.87  10.6        16,853,438 
Texas                              6,586,900.85                  10.9                     6,615,900.85  10.9        60,425,369 
Utah                                 865,269.39                  10.1                        908,269.39  10.6          8,591,768 
Vermont                                 290,310.58                    9.0                        291,310.58  9.0          3,219,388 
Virginia                              2,505,774.98                  10.3                     2,566,774.98  10.6        24,313,963 
Washington                              2,460,710.51                    9.5                     2,585,710.51  10.0        25,901,790 
West Virginia                                 748,803.75                    9.9                        769,803.75  10.2          7,551,834 
Wisconsin                              2,708,419.86                  11.9                     2,781,919.86  12.2        22,833,463 
Wyoming                                 401,821.77                  15.7                        419,821.77  16.4          2,552,590 
Given the difficulty in establishing a significant fund balance, rules would also have to
be in place to allow states to suspend contributions when withdrawals are needed to
balance the state budget.  The first rule for suspending contributions would allow a state
with a balance of greater than 15% to suspend contributions, but additional rules could
allow a state to suspend contributions when real revenue growth is negative or if
personal income growth is negative.
Step 2—Rules for operating the fund once capitalized
Establishing the experience rating 
In order for the fund to create the right incentives for states to manage their budgets
wisely, states need to be rewarded for good and bad budgeting practice.  The most
elegant (but most likely not the most practical approach) would create a specific
experience rating for each state based on the volatility of its revenue and expenditure
system.  States whose revenue systems tended to crash during recessions while seeing
spikes in expenditures should have an incentive to build larger surpluses in the rainy
day fund.  States that have relatively stable revenues and expenditures would not need
to carry such large balances.  However, measuring revenue and expenditure volatility is
a tricky business since legislative changes in tax rate and bases can effect revenue
measures and changes in program criteria can effect eligibility for many large spending
programs such as Medicaid.  While elasticity measures might be able to serve as
proxies for experience ratings, these measurements are far from exact and might even
be subject to gaming. (see appendix 2, tax elasticities by state)
Russell Sobel (2000), suggests an analysis of revenue variability could be constructed
for each tax source in a state. This could be done by decomposing the variation in each
source of tax revenue into two components—cyclical variability and random variance.
Cyclical variability would be measured as the change in revenue historically associated
with a 1 percent change in the state economy.  The movement in tax revenue not
accounted for by movements in the state economy is then considered to be random
variance.  The limitation of such a measure is that it is based on the historic relationship
between tax revenues and economic growth in a state and this can change overtime. For the purpose of establishing an experience rating, potential both cyclical variability
and random variance could be used to adjust a state’s contribution to the fund.  States
with high variance in both indicators would be expected to carry larger balances.
From a practical perspective, some institution would be required to annually calculate
revenue variability but this could be done either by a state revenue agency or the fund
administrator.
To be fair, a similar measure of expenditure variability would need to be created.  It is
possible for some states due to demographic characteristics or public policy decisions
to experience larger expenditure spikes during bad times.  States with more generous
counter-cyclical aid programs for the unemployed and indigent will face greater fiscal
pressure than states with more restrictive policies.
A second alternative would borrow from the work of Corina and Nelson (2003)
11 and
develop state specific value at risk (VAR) models to serve as proxies for experience
ratings. VAR is a statistic developed in the risk management literature. Jorian (2001)
12
describes VAR as summarizing the…”worst loss over a target horizon with a given
level of confidence.  More formally VAR describes the quartile of the forecasted PDF
of gains and loses over the target horizon.  If 1-p is the selected confidence level, VAR
corresponds to the p lower-tailed level.”  
Corina and Nelson provide a simulation of VAR for the state of Utah for 2003.  In their
example the portfolio of state revenues consists of sales, income and corporate
franchise taxes.  Using a commercial available spreadsheet program, the authors
produced a probability distribution function (PDF) for the budget surplus/deficit for
Utah simulating over 10,000 values.  The simulation calculated that a 5% chance would
exist that a deficit of $135.75 million or more might occur in FY03.  In otherwords, an
RDF of $135.75 million would give the state adequate revenues to match planned
expenditures 95 percent of the time.
This approach has several potential advantages. A primary advantage is that it allows a
measurement of a portfolio of taxes that can be decomposed into systemic and and
unsystemic risk.  This allows the development of a unique measure of risk over the
business cycle for states using significantly differing tax structures.  In addition as VAR
is used extensively in risk management, an extensive literature and the development of
software and specific tools to accommodate this measure already exist.  In addition
VAR can be run at differing levels of confidence and produce state specific measures
for optimal rainy day fund size.  Such an approach would allow a central fund
administrator to provide reasonable estimates across all states using a standard
methodology that could be easily and efficiently produced.
                                                          
11 Corina, Gary C. and Ray D. Nelson, “Rainy Day Funds and Value at Risk”  State Tax Notes, August 25,
2003, pp.563-567.
12 Jorian, Phillipe. 2001 Value at Risk (Second Edition), New York, McGraw-HillA very simple alternative, is to establish a floating cap based on the experience of the
state in utilizing the fund during a recession.  For example if a state exhausted its fund
balance during a recession and was forced to borrow, its post-recessionary fund cap
might be raised to 18 to 20% of expenditures rather than 15%.  Conversely for states
maintaining a fund balance, interest could be paid on their reserves to reward good
budgeting practice or its fund cap might be reduced to 10%. Of course since rainy day
funds are countercyclical, states would be permitted a rerasonable period of time to
restore their fund balances, perhaps 5 to 7 years.
Creating a withdrawal rule
A goal of the fund should be to allow states to use rainy day funds as they see
appropriate.  The experience rating provision should provide enough of an incentive for
states to be prudent in using their funds, but it should not discourage the states from
making significant withdrawals when conditions warrant such actions.  Given this
states should be permitted to withdrawal up to half of their existing balance in a given
year however the withdrawal should also have to pass an economic test.  These
economic tests could include a drop in real revenue over the preceding year or an
increase in unemployment by 1% or more or a decline in personal income.  The
economic tests should not be particularly rigorous and states would still have their own
options for creating withdrawal rules specific to their state in addition to this national
rule.
Borrowing
If a state faced a protracted downturn, it could deplete its entire balance in two years.
In such a case, a state might want to borrow from the fund to help alleviate fiscal stress
if tax and spending options are inadequate to restore fiscal balance.  Borrowing
however would require the payment of interest to the fund.  It would be a last resort for
a state, but it might still be a better option than making draconian tax or expenditure
cuts.
Who administers the fund?
Most likely a quasi-governmental agency created by the states would be the logical
organization to administer the fund.  The agency would need to be autonomous enough
to enforce rainy day fund rules and to have sufficient expertise to adjust rainy day fund
structure to reflect emerging conditions.  If specific experience ratings were created to
reflect state revenue and expenditure volatility, the agency would need to have the staff
expertise to calculate annual experience ratings.  The agency would need to function as
an independent third party administrator.
If the fund had been created, would it have helped over the recent recession?
A final simulation (table 4) illustrates the cumulative deficits reported by states from
FY 2002 to 2004.  In addition, it simulates the states fund balance if it had beenparticipating in a national rainy day fund based on the rules suggested in this proposal.
As the table illustrates, reserves would not have been sufficient for all states to have
entered fiscal 2005 in the black.  Twenty-two states would have exhausted their rainy
day funds over this period with the state of California accounting for nearly 56% of the
rainy day fund deficit.  However, absent any other budget actions such as spending cuts
or tax increases, the existence of the fund would have covered 74% of the cumulative
deficit for the states.  In addition, it should be remembered that rainy day funds should
not cover structural state deficits.  Recent state fiscal experience suggests that many
states have experienced structural rather than cyclical deficits that will require revenue
and expenditure actions in addition to tapping rainy day funds.
Table 4--Cumulative state deficit, FY02, 03, 04 vs simulated rainy day balance
Cumulative deficit Simulated RDF balance Remaining 
2002-2004 (in millions) Balance
Alabama               1,465.0                         1,535.7            70.7 
Alaska               2,292.0                           930.8       (1,361.2)
Arkansas                 243.0                           972.9           729.9 
Arizona               2,350.0                         1,548.0          (802.0)
California             35,600.0                       14,381.1     (21,218.9)
Colorado               1,843.0                         1,544.7          (298.3)
Connecticut               1,791.5                         1,670.4          (121.1)
Delaware                   44.2                           463.8           419.6 
Florida               3,300.0                         4,711.0        1,411.0 
Georgia               1,950.0                         2,619.2           669.2 
Hawaii                     4.6                           621.1           616.5 
Iowa                 208.0                         1,046.9           838.9 
Idaho                 356.0                           483.1           127.1 
Illinois               3,474.0                         4,180.9           706.9 
Indiana               1,750.0                         1,940.1           190.1 
Kansas               1,067.3                           945.0          (122.3)
Kentucky               1,113.0                         1,645.2           532.2 
Louisiana                   86.0                         1,676.0        1,590.0 
Massachusetts               3,947.0                         2,926.4       (1,020.6)
Maryland               1,914.0                         1,924.5            10.5 
Maine                 653.2                           546.0          (107.2)
Michigan               3,042.0                         4,654.8        1,612.8 
Minnesota               6,085.0                         2,272.6       (3,812.4)
Missouri               1,928.3                         1,812.3          (116.0)
Mississippi                 176.8                         1,076.8           900.0 
Montana                 124.0                           360.3           236.3 
North Carolina               3,700.0                         3,001.2          (698.8)
North Dakota                     7.6                           309.5           301.9 
Nebraska                 829.5                           586.9          (242.6)
New Hampshire               1,386.0                           404.4          (981.6)
New Jersey             11,900.0                         3,441.7       (8,458.3)
New Mexico                   42.0                           962.2           920.2 
New York             15,500.0                         9,313.2       (6,186.8)
Nevada                 790.0                           607.4          (182.6)
Ohio               5,441.6                         4,106.0       (1,335.6)
Oklahoma               1,091.7                         1,137.7            46.0 Oregon               2,667.0                         1,631.5       (1,035.5)
Pennsylvania               3,122.0                         4,465.3        1,343.3 
Rhode Island                 530.0                           452.2           (77.8)
South Carolina               1,531.0                         1,449.4           (81.6)
South Dakota                 102.1                           266.4           164.3 
Tennessee               1,996.0                         1,682.4          (313.6)
Texas               8,000.0                         6,586.9       (1,413.1)
Utah                 373.0                           865.3           492.3 
Virginia               3,366.0                         2,505.7          (860.3)
Vermont                   88.0                           290.3           202.3 
Washington               2,454.0                         2,460.7              6.7 
Wisconsin               5,285.3                         2,708.4       (2,576.9)
West Virginia                   20.0                           748.8           728.8 
Wyoming  n/a                           401.8           401.8 
          147,030.7                     108,874.9     (38,155.8)
Conclusion
Research has demonstrated that rainy day funds can be a meaningful counter-cyclical
tool to relieve state fiscal stress.  Research has also demonstrated that rainy day funds
are most effective when states have strict rules governing contributions and
withdrawals.  This proposal for a national rainy day fund is based on a practical
problem states face when trying to put aside significant savings.  Once significant
balances accrue, political pressure to spend the balances or cut taxes deplete fund
balances.  A national fund would allow reserves to accumulate without facing this
political constraint.  The fiscal and economic benefits of smoother state fiscal behavior
over the business cycle could make the creation of such a fund a significant benefit to
both the states and the nation as a whole. 
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Appendix 1 
An alternative—the Washington Tax Study Model
In 2001, the state of Washington created a commission to carry out a comprehensive
analysis of the states tax structure.  Among the items discussed was a proposed
restructuring of the state’s rainy day fund.  The commission suggested several rules for
contributions and withdrawals from the fund.  First on the contribution side, revenues
would be based on transferring up to 1% of general fund revenues to the rainy day fund
based on certain economic criteria.  The level of transfer would be based on thedifference between the predicted growth rate in general fund revenues (as forecasted by
the states Office of Forecast Council (OFC)) and the predicted growth in the Seattle
Consumer Price Index.  For example in FY97 (a boom year for the state) the estimated
increase in general fund revenues was $429.9 million or 5%.  The Seattle CPI 1.587%.
Since the general fund revenues growth would exceed the CPI, the maximum
contribution of 1% of general fund revenues would be required.  In that year general fund
revenues were slightly over $9 billion, so a 1% transfer would equal $90 million.  The
Washington proposal caps fund size at 10% of general fund revenues.
The Washington plan would also structure withdrawals.  To begin with no more than the
current balance of the fund could be withdrawn in a given fiscal year. Annual
withdrawals would also be govern by the relationship between percentage revenue
growth and the Seattle CPI.  For example, in FY2002, the OFC predicted that general
fund revenues would grow by a relatively anemic 1.7% (from $10.7 billion in FY01 to
$10.9 billion in FY02).  In the meantime, the Seattle CPI was expected to increase to
2.2%.  The difference between these two (1.7-2.2) would yield –0.5.  The negative
number would trigger a rainy day fund withdrawal equal to 0.5 times the level of general
fund revenues ($10.7 billion) or roughly $50 million.
Appendix 2
Tax elasticities by state
Recent work by Bruce, Fox and Tuttle (2002)
13 produced long-run tax base elasticities for
the two primary state tax bases—sales and personal income.  The study demonstrates that
there is considerable variability in state tax base elasticities caused primarily by the
policy choices of individual states.  As a general rule of thumb, the income tax is
significantly more elastic than the sales tax with an average elasticity across all states
nearly twice that of the sales tax.  The authors find that for the personal income tax that
states are more income elastic when the maximum tax bracket occurs at lower income
levels, pensions are taxed and where the tax rate structure is more progressive.  In the
case of the sales tax, states with broader bases and larger shares being paid by consumers
tend to have higher income elasticities.
14
The variation in tax elasticities and the relative dependence on a particular tax base in
each state could be modeled to provide 






                                                          
13 Donald Bruce, William F. Fox and M.H. Tuttle, “Tax Base Elasticities: A Multi-State Analysis of Long
Run Dynamics”, University of Tennessee, December 2002.

























New Jersey 1.049 2.016
New Mexico .924 3.024
New York .750 1.295
North Carolina .874 1.545





Rhode Island .531 1.756








West Virginia 1.013 2.569
Wisconsin 1.113 1.215Wyoming .720
Source:  Donald Bruce, William F. Fox and M.H. Tuttle, “Tax Base Elasticities: A
Multi-State Analysis of Long Run and Short Run Dynamics”, December 2002, mimeo,
University of Tennessee.
Appendix 3—State Budget Deficits
State Budget Deficits FY 2002, 2003, 2004
2002 2002 2003 2003 2004 2004
State Deficit deficit % of
budget
deficit deficit % of budget deficit deficit % of
budget
Alabama              160.0  3.1             5.0  0.4              1,300.0  24.2
Alaska              906.0  40.1          490.0  20.6                896.0  37.8
Arkansas                20.0  0.6               -    0                223.0  7
Arizona              850.0  14.1          500.0  8              1,000.0  15.8
California            4,500.0  6.8       6,100.0  7.8  15,000 to
25,000 
19.5 to 32.5
Colorado              385.0  6.4          558.0  9.2                900.0  13.4
Connecticut                96.0  0.9          495.5  4.1  1,000 to 1,200  8.6 to 10.3
Delaware  n/a  n/a           44.2  1.8  n/a  n/a
Florida            1,300.0  7               -    0              2,000.0  10.1
Georgia              600.0  4.4          450.0  3.1                900.0  5.8
Hawaii  n/a  n/a          162.0  4.6  n/a  n/a
Iowa              158.0  3.3           50.0  1  n/a  n/a
Idaho                36.0  2.1          160.0  8.1                160.0  8.1
Illinois              500.0  2.2          200.0  0.9              2,774.0  11.4
Indiana  456 to 600  5.0 to 6.7          300.0  3                850.0  8.8
Kansas              113.0  2.6          254.3  5.8                700.0  15.7
Kentucky              533.0  8.1          220.0  5                360.0  5.1
Louisiana  n/a  n/a           86.0  1.3  n/a  n/a
Massachusetts            1,400.0  6.7          547.0  2.6  1,400 to 2,000  6.1 to 8.8
Maryland              124.0  1.4          590.0  5.5              1,200.0  11
Maine                30.0  1.3          148.2  5.8  375 to 475  14.5 to 18.4
Michigan              642.0  6.5          600.0  6.5              1,800.0  19.6
Minnesota            1,953.0  17       1,690.0  11.5              2,442.0  18.7
Missouri                80.0  2.3          848.3  10.7              1,000.0  13.1
Mississippi                80.0  2.3           96.8  2.8  n/a  n/a
Montana  n/a  n/a           58.0  4.6                  66.0  4.9
North Carolina  n/a  n/a       1,700.0  11  1700 to 2000  12.4 to 14.6
North Dakota  n/a  n/a             7.6  0.9  n/a  n/a
Nebraska              220.0  9.4          160.5  5.9  337 to 449  21.2 to 28.2
New Hampshire  n/a  n/a          490.0  20.6                896.0  37.8
New Jersey            1,900.0  9.8       6,000.0  25.6              4,000.0  19
New Mexico                12.0  0.4           30.0  0.8  n/a  n/a
New York            3,000.0  8.1       2,500.0  6.3  7000 to 10000  17 to 24.3
Nevada  n/a  n/a          206.0  10.5  400 to 534  21.2 to 28.2
Ohio  1500*  8.1       1,941.6  8.4              2,000.0  9.2
Oklahoma  n/a  n/a          291.7  20.6                800.0  15.9Oregon  900*  8.7          500.0  4.6  950 to 1267  20.4 to 27.2
Pennsylvania              622.0  n/a          500.0  2.4  500 to 2000  2.4 to 9.6
Rhode Island  80 to 100  3.6 to 4.5          300.0  11.2  100 to 130  3.8 to 4.9
South Carolina              500.0  9.7          331.0  6.1                700.0  13.6
South Dakota                12.0  1.6           36.1  4.1                  54.0  6.4
Tennessee              300.0  4.6          800.0  8.2                896.0  37.8
Texas  n/a  n/a               -    0  2500 to 8000  8.2 to 26.2
Utah              200.0  5.9          173.0  4.7  n/a  n/a
Virginia            1,300.0  11.5          950.0  7.7              1,116.0  9.3
Vermont  35 to 50  4.1 to 5.8           38.0  4.2  n/a  n/a
Washington  200 to 1000  2 to 9.8          120.0  1.2  1,000 to 1334  8.2 to 11.9
Wisconsin  300 to 1300  2.7 to 11.5       1,117.3  5  1300 to 2868  11.5 to 25.3
West Virginia  n/a  n/a               -    0                200.0  7.1
Wyoming  n/a  n/a               -    0                     -    0
Source:  //www.pbs.org/now/politics/budgetmap.html
Data for FY 2003, NCSL Fiscal survey November 2002
data for FY 2004, Center for Budget and Policy Priorities
data for FY 2002, State Fiscal Brief, Rockefeller Institute of Government, no. 63, January, 2002
* biennial total1
Working Paper Series
A series of research studies on regional economic issues relating to the Seventh Federal
Reserve District, and on financial and economic topics.
Dynamic Monetary Equilibrium in a Random-Matching Economy WP-00-1
Edward J. Green and Ruilin Zhou
The Effects of Health, Wealth, and Wages on Labor Supply and Retirement Behavior WP-00-2
Eric French
Market Discipline in the Governance of U.S. Bank Holding Companies:  WP-00-3
Monitoring vs. Influencing
Robert R. Bliss and Mark J. Flannery
Using Market Valuation to Assess the Importance and Efficiency
of Public School Spending WP-00-4
Lisa Barrow and Cecilia Elena Rouse
Employment Flows, Capital Mobility, and Policy Analysis WP-00-5
Marcelo Veracierto
Does the Community Reinvestment Act Influence Lending? An Analysis
of Changes in Bank Low-Income Mortgage Activity  WP-00-6
Drew Dahl, Douglas D. Evanoff and Michael F. Spivey
Subordinated Debt and Bank Capital Reform WP-00-7
Douglas D. Evanoff and Larry D. Wall
The Labor Supply Response To (Mismeasured But) Predictable Wage Changes WP-00-8
Eric French
For How Long Are Newly Chartered Banks Financially Fragile? WP-00-9
Robert DeYoung
Bank Capital Regulation With and Without State-Contingent Penalties WP-00-10
David A. Marshall and Edward S. Prescott
Why Is Productivity Procyclical? Why Do We Care? WP-00-11
Susanto Basu and John Fernald
Oligopoly Banking and Capital Accumulation WP-00-12
Nicola Cetorelli and Pietro F. Peretto
Puzzles in the Chinese Stock Market WP-00-13
John Fernald and John H. Rogers
The Effects of Geographic Expansion on Bank Efficiency WP-00-14
Allen N. Berger and Robert DeYoung
Idiosyncratic Risk and Aggregate Employment Dynamics WP-00-15
Jeffrey R. Campbell and Jonas D.M. Fisher2
Working Paper Series (continued)
Post-Resolution Treatment of Depositors at Failed Banks: Implications for the Severity
of Banking Crises, Systemic Risk, and Too-Big-To-Fail WP-00-16
George G. Kaufman and Steven A. Seelig
The Double Play: Simultaneous Speculative Attacks on Currency and Equity Markets WP-00-17
Sujit Chakravorti and Subir Lall
Capital Requirements and Competition in the Banking Industry WP-00-18
Peter J.G. Vlaar
Financial-Intermediation Regime and Efficiency in a Boyd-Prescott Economy WP-00-19
Yeong-Yuh Chiang and Edward J. Green
How Do Retail Prices React to Minimum Wage Increases? WP-00-20
James M. MacDonald and Daniel Aaronson
Financial Signal Processing: A Self Calibrating Model WP-00-21
Robert J. Elliott, William C. Hunter and Barbara M. Jamieson
An Empirical Examination of the Price-Dividend Relation with Dividend Management WP-00-22
Lucy F. Ackert and William C. Hunter
Savings of Young Parents WP-00-23
Annamaria Lusardi, Ricardo Cossa, and Erin L. Krupka
The Pitfalls in Inferring Risk from Financial Market Data WP-00-24
Robert R. Bliss
What Can Account for Fluctuations in the Terms of Trade? WP-00-25
Marianne Baxter and Michael A. Kouparitsas
Data Revisions and the Identification of Monetary Policy Shocks WP-00-26
Dean Croushore and Charles L. Evans
Recent Evidence on the Relationship Between Unemployment and Wage Growth WP-00-27
Daniel Aaronson and Daniel Sullivan
Supplier Relationships and Small Business Use of Trade Credit WP-00-28
Daniel Aaronson, Raphael Bostic, Paul Huck and Robert Townsend
What are the Short-Run Effects of Increasing Labor Market Flexibility? WP-00-29
Marcelo Veracierto
Equilibrium Lending Mechanism and Aggregate Activity WP-00-30
Cheng Wang and Ruilin Zhou
Impact of Independent Directors and the Regulatory Environment on Bank Merger Prices:
Evidence from Takeover Activity in the 1990s WP-00-31
Elijah Brewer III, William E. Jackson III, and Julapa A. Jagtiani
Does Bank Concentration Lead to Concentration in Industrial Sectors? WP-01-01
Nicola Cetorelli3
Working Paper Series (continued)
On the Fiscal Implications of Twin Crises WP-01-02
Craig Burnside, Martin Eichenbaum and Sergio Rebelo
Sub-Debt Yield Spreads as Bank Risk Measures WP-01-03
Douglas D. Evanoff and Larry D. Wall
Productivity Growth in the 1990s: Technology, Utilization, or Adjustment? WP-01-04
Susanto Basu, John G. Fernald and Matthew D. Shapiro
Do Regulators Search for the Quiet Life?  The Relationship Between Regulators and
The Regulated in Banking WP-01-05
Richard J. Rosen
Learning-by-Doing, Scale Efficiencies, and Financial Performance at Internet-Only Banks WP-01-06
Robert DeYoung
The Role of Real Wages, Productivity, and Fiscal Policy in Germany’s
Great Depression 1928-37 WP-01-07
Jonas D. M. Fisher and Andreas Hornstein
Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary Policy WP-01-08
Lawrence J. Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum and Charles L. Evans
Outsourcing Business Service and the Scope of Local Markets WP-01-09
Yukako Ono
The Effect of Market Size Structure on Competition:  The Case of Small Business Lending WP-01-10
Allen N. Berger, Richard J. Rosen and Gregory F. Udell
Deregulation, the Internet, and the Competitive Viability of Large Banks  WP-01-11
and Community Banks
Robert DeYoung and William C. Hunter
Price Ceilings as Focal Points for Tacit Collusion: Evidence from Credit Cards WP-01-12
Christopher R. Knittel and Victor Stango
Gaps and Triangles WP-01-13
Bernardino Adão, Isabel Correia and Pedro Teles
A Real Explanation for Heterogeneous Investment Dynamics WP-01-14
Jonas D.M. Fisher
Recovering Risk Aversion from Options WP-01-15
Robert R. Bliss and Nikolaos Panigirtzoglou
Economic Determinants of the Nominal Treasury Yield Curve WP-01-16
Charles L. Evans and David Marshall
Price Level Uniformity in a Random Matching Model with Perfectly Patient Traders WP-01-17
Edward J. Green and Ruilin Zhou
Earnings Mobility in the US:  A New Look at Intergenerational Inequality WP-01-18
Bhashkar Mazumder4
Working Paper Series (continued)
The Effects of Health Insurance and Self-Insurance on Retirement Behavior WP-01-19
Eric French and John Bailey Jones
The Effect of Part-Time Work on Wages:  Evidence from the Social Security Rules WP-01-20
Daniel Aaronson and Eric French
Antidumping Policy Under Imperfect Competition WP-01-21
Meredith A. Crowley
Is the United States an Optimum Currency Area?
An Empirical Analysis of Regional Business Cycles WP-01-22
Michael A. Kouparitsas
A Note on the Estimation of Linear Regression Models with Heteroskedastic
Measurement Errors WP-01-23
Daniel G. Sullivan
The Mis-Measurement of Permanent Earnings: New Evidence from Social WP-01-24
Security Earnings Data
Bhashkar Mazumder
Pricing IPOs of Mutual Thrift Conversions: The Joint Effect of Regulation
and Market Discipline WP-01-25
Elijah Brewer III, Douglas D. Evanoff and Jacky So
Opportunity Cost and Prudentiality: An Analysis of Collateral Decisions in
Bilateral and Multilateral Settings WP-01-26
Herbert L. Baer, Virginia G. France and James T. Moser
Outsourcing Business Services and the Role of Central Administrative Offices WP-02-01
Yukako Ono
Strategic Responses to Regulatory Threat in the Credit Card Market* WP-02-02
Victor Stango
The Optimal Mix of Taxes on Money, Consumption and Income WP-02-03
Fiorella De Fiore and Pedro Teles
Expectation Traps and Monetary Policy WP-02-04
Stefania Albanesi, V. V. Chari and Lawrence J. Christiano
Monetary Policy in a Financial Crisis WP-02-05
Lawrence J. Christiano, Christopher Gust and Jorge Roldos
Regulatory Incentives and Consolidation: The Case of Commercial Bank Mergers
and the Community Reinvestment Act WP-02-06
Raphael Bostic, Hamid Mehran, Anna Paulson and Marc Saidenberg
Technological Progress and the Geographic Expansion of the Banking Industry WP-02-07
Allen N. Berger and Robert DeYoung5
Working Paper Series (continued)
Choosing the Right Parents:  Changes in the Intergenerational Transmission  WP-02-08
of Inequality  Between 1980 and the Early 1990s
David I. Levine and Bhashkar Mazumder
The Immediacy Implications of Exchange Organization WP-02-09
James T. Moser
Maternal Employment and Overweight Children  WP-02-10
Patricia M. Anderson, Kristin F. Butcher and Phillip B. Levine
The Costs and Benefits of Moral Suasion:  Evidence from the Rescue of  WP-02-11
Long-Term Capital Management
Craig Furfine
On the Cyclical Behavior of Employment, Unemployment and Labor Force Participation WP-02-12
Marcelo Veracierto
Do Safeguard Tariffs and Antidumping Duties Open or Close Technology Gaps? WP-02-13
Meredith A. Crowley
Technology Shocks Matter WP-02-14
Jonas D. M. Fisher
Money as a Mechanism in a Bewley Economy WP-02-15
Edward J. Green and Ruilin Zhou
Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy:  Equivalence Results WP-02-16
Isabel Correia, Juan Pablo Nicolini and Pedro Teles
Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations and the Dynamics of Retail Trade Industries WP-02-17
on the U.S.-Canada Border
Jeffrey R. Campbell and Beverly Lapham
Bank Procyclicality, Credit Crunches, and Asymmetric Monetary Policy Effects:   WP-02-18
A Unifying Model
Robert R. Bliss and George G. Kaufman
Location of Headquarter Growth During the 90s WP-02-19
Thomas H. Klier
The Value of Banking Relationships During a Financial Crisis: WP-02-20
Evidence from Failures of Japanese Banks
Elijah Brewer III, Hesna Genay, William Curt Hunter and George G. Kaufman
On the Distribution and Dynamics of Health Costs WP-02-21
Eric French and John Bailey Jones
The Effects of Progressive Taxation on Labor Supply when Hours and Wages are  WP-02-22
Jointly Determined
Daniel Aaronson and Eric French6
Working Paper Series (continued)
Inter-industry Contagion and the Competitive Effects of Financial Distress Announcements:  WP-02-23
Evidence from Commercial Banks and Life Insurance Companies
Elijah Brewer III and William E. Jackson III
State-Contingent Bank Regulation With Unobserved Action and WP-02-24
Unobserved Characteristics
David A. Marshall and Edward Simpson Prescott
Local Market Consolidation and Bank Productive Efficiency WP-02-25
Douglas D. Evanoff and Evren Örs
Life-Cycle Dynamics in Industrial Sectors. The Role of Banking Market Structure WP-02-26
Nicola Cetorelli
Private School Location and Neighborhood Characteristics WP-02-27
Lisa Barrow
Teachers and Student Achievement in the Chicago Public High Schools WP-02-28
Daniel Aaronson, Lisa Barrow and William Sander
The Crime of 1873: Back to the Scene WP-02-29
François R. Velde
Trade Structure, Industrial Structure, and International Business Cycles WP-02-30
Marianne Baxter and Michael A. Kouparitsas
Estimating the Returns to Community College Schooling for Displaced Workers WP-02-31
Louis Jacobson, Robert LaLonde and Daniel G. Sullivan
A Proposal for Efficiently Resolving Out-of-the-Money Swap Positions  WP-03-01
at Large Insolvent Banks
George G. Kaufman
Depositor Liquidity and Loss-Sharing in Bank Failure Resolutions WP-03-02
George G. Kaufman
Subordinated Debt and Prompt Corrective Regulatory Action WP-03-03
Douglas D. Evanoff and Larry D. Wall
When is Inter-Transaction Time Informative? WP-03-04
Craig Furfine
Tenure Choice with Location Selection: The Case of Hispanic Neighborhoods WP-03-05
in Chicago
Maude Toussaint-Comeau and Sherrie L.W. Rhine
Distinguishing Limited Commitment from Moral Hazard in Models of WP-03-06
Growth with Inequality*
Anna L. Paulson and Robert Townsend
Resolving Large Complex Financial Organizations WP-03-07
Robert R. Bliss7
Working Paper Series (continued)
The Case of the Missing Productivity Growth: WP-03-08
Or, Does information technology explain why productivity accelerated in the United States
but not the United Kingdom?
Susanto Basu, John G. Fernald, Nicholas Oulton and Sylaja Srinivasan
Inside-Outside Money Competition WP-03-09
Ramon Marimon, Juan Pablo Nicolini and Pedro Teles
The Importance of Check-Cashing Businesses to the Unbanked: Racial/Ethnic Differences WP-03-10
William H. Greene, Sherrie L.W. Rhine and Maude Toussaint-Comeau
A Structural Empirical Model of Firm Growth, Learning, and Survival WP-03-11
Jaap H. Abbring and Jeffrey R. Campbell
Market Size Matters WP-03-12
Jeffrey R. Campbell and Hugo A. Hopenhayn
The Cost of Business Cycles under Endogenous Growth WP-03-13
Gadi Barlevy
The Past, Present, and Probable Future for Community Banks WP-03-14
Robert DeYoung, William C. Hunter and Gregory F. Udell
Measuring Productivity Growth in Asia: Do Market Imperfections Matter? WP-03-15
John Fernald and Brent Neiman
Revised Estimates of Intergenerational Income Mobility in the United States WP-03-16
Bhashkar Mazumder
Product Market Evidence on the Employment Effects of the Minimum Wage WP-03-17
Daniel Aaronson and Eric French
Estimating Models of On-the-Job Search using Record Statistics WP-03-18
Gadi Barlevy
Banking Market Conditions and Deposit Interest Rates  WP-03-19
Richard J. Rosen
Creating a National State Rainy Day Fund: A Modest Proposal to Improve Future  WP-03-20
State Fiscal Performance
Richard Mattoon